the justification of a law of action is based on the good its general observance does, but not a utilitarian as regards particular actions. It may be right to do more harm than good if we are acting in accord with a good general law. A number of difficult questions remain outstanding. In particular—Why should I refrain from doing good by breaking a law merely because it would do great harm if most people broke it, which there is no prospect of their doing, at any rate as a result of my action? And is it less difficult to be an intuitionist about what is intrinsically good, which Mr. Mabbott must be to establish his rules, than about what is right? His lecture is lucid and stimulating, but we are painfully aware of the limits of space which prevent him from further discussing these questions. It is much to be hoped that he will some time produce a full-scale book on ethics.

A. C. EWING.

Sense without Matter, or Direct Perception. A. A. LUCE. (Nelson. Pp. ix, 165.)

Dr. Luce, who is well known to all philosophers for his life-long devotion to the study of Berkeley and for his valuable contributions to Berkeley scholarship, has published in this little book a lively and spirited attack on "matter" from the Berkeleian point of view. Like his master, Dr. Luce writes in an admirably simple clear style, with the minimum of technicalities, and the book can be recommended as an attractive introduction for the layman to some important aspects of Berkeley's philosophy. In this review I shall confine my remarks to a few selected topics.

(1) *Matter.* As Dr. Luce points out, "matter" is a highly ambiguous word. In one sense it is a common name for such objects of actual or possible sense-perception as trees, stones, drops of water, clouds, etc. In that sense its use implies no theory, and anyone who believes that there are things answering to such names may be said to "believe in the existence of matter." Let us call this "matter in the *empirical* sense." At the opposite extreme "matter" is used to denote the supposed *substratum* in which all the qualities, dispositional properties, and variable states of any bit of "matter," in the empirical sense, are held to *inhere*. In that sense its use implies a certain metaphysical theory, and anyone who finds that theory unintelligible or incredible may be said to "disbelieve in the existence of matter." Let us call this "matter in the *Aristotelian* sense." Dr. Luce, like everyone else, accepts the existence of matter in the empirical sense. He says that he is concerned only to deny the existence of matter in the Aristotelian sense.

Now it is plain that there are intermediate possibilities. Suppose we ask ourselves, e.g., the question: Did Leibniz accept or reject the existence of matter? (i) Certainly he would have agreed that there are objects which we do or could perceive with our senses, and that the names "tree," "stone," "cloud," etc., can properly be applied to certain of them. (ii) Certainly he would have rejected matter in the Aristotelian sense. (iii) But it is also certain that he held that what a person perceives, when he would correctly and truly be said to be "seeing and touching a stone," is profoundly unlike what that person perceives it as being. He perceives it as brown and cold and roughly spherical and hard and massive. But in fact, according to Leibniz, what he perceives has and can have none of these properties. It has other properties, completely different from and incompatible with these, which he does not perceive it as having, viz., the property of being a collection of highly confused minds whose "points of view" all fall within certain narrow limits. We may put the case as follows. "Matter" in the empirical sense has a certain generally

accepted (if vaguely formulated) *connotation* as well as a generally accepted *denotation*, and so we must distinguish between what I will call the *purely ostensive* and the *connotative* aspects of the empirical sense of "matter." Leibniz accepted the existence of matter in the purely ostensive empirical sense of that word; he rejected its existence, not only in the Aristotelian sense, but also in the connotative empirical sense.

The above distinction is highly relevant to Dr. Luce's position. For an essential part of his doctrine is the positive contention that matter, in the purely ostensive empirical sense, has the properties which we perceive it as having, i.e. that there is matter in the *connotative* empirical sense.

There is another distinction which needs to be drawn, and which Dr. Luce seems often to ignore. We must distinguish between "material substance" in the Aristotelian sense of a *substratum* in which certain qualities and dispositions inhere and certain events occur, and "material substance" in one at least of the senses in which Kant used the term "thing-in-itself." In the latter sense a "material substance" means the supposed *common source* of certain recurrent bundles of actual and possible sensations, such that when one of them occurs in a person's experience he would claim correctly to be perceiving a certain empirical material substance, e.g. the Albert Memorial. It is easy to see that the two notions of *substratum* and of *thing-in-itself* are fundamentally different, even if both should be chimerical. In the first place, a thing-in-itself, in the above sense, would have dispositional properties and variable occurrent states; therefore, if the Aristotelian doctrine of substance were correct, there would be *within it* the distinction of substratum and accidents. Secondly, there would be no logical inconsistency in combining the Aristotelian account of substance with a naïvely realistic account of sense-perception. On that combination of views, when a person perceives with his senses an empirical material substance, he is perceiving a certain *substratum* as having those very qualities which in fact inhere in it, and as undergoing those very changes which in fact are occurring in it, independently of whether he or anyone else should happen to be perceiving them.

Dr. Luce constantly twits matter, in the *Aristotelian* sense, with being something in principle imperceptible. This would be true, I think, of matter in the sense of *thing-in-itself*. But, if the Aristotelian doctrine of substance were combined, as it might logically be, with a realist account of sense-perception, matter in the Aristotelian sense, so far from being in principle imperceptible, would be precisely what a person *is* perceiving whenever he sees or touches or tastes or smells a body.

(2) *Diversity of Visual and Tactual Sense-data.* Dr. Luce, like Berkeley, takes for granted that anything which a person literally *sees* or could see must be numerically diverse from anything which a person literally *touches* or could touch. I do not find this self-evident, and I do not know how it could be proved. Berkeley's own argument for it has always seemed to me weak. It seems to me that it is here that the Berkelian doctrine plainly comes in conflict with what common sense uncritically takes for granted. I do not regard this as a conclusive objection to the doctrine itself; but it is an objection to the claim that there is no conflict between the Berkeleian and the plain man.

(3) *Causation.* In Chapter V Dr. Luce explains and defends Berkeley's doctrine of causation. According to this, the word "cause" is ambiguous. In one sense it means *efficient* cause, and Dr. Luce describes an efficient cause as that which "makes changes begin to be." In the other sense it means a perceptible event which is a reliable sign of another such event. It is held to be self-evident that nothing can be an efficient cause except a mind exercising volition. God is a persistent efficient cause, and each of us is from time to time

an efficient cause in a small way. Dr. Luce says that in us "feeling of effort, be it muscular, mental, or mixed, is the index of . . . causal power."

Much has been written on this topic from Hume's time to the present day, and Dr. Luce does not here consider the objections which have been raised or the answers which have been proposed. I will content myself here with the following two remarks. (i) Is it an accurate account of the agency which Berkeleians ascribe to God to say that he "makes changes begin to be"? I should have thought not. (ii) In the case of a finite person who at a certain moment makes a voluntary movement of his body or voluntarily calls up an image, how far is it correct to say that he "makes a change begin to be"? Only, I should have thought, in a secondary sense. What he does, surely, is to make a modification in a process of change which is already going on independently of his volition, e.g. in the electric currents in his brain or in the course of his thoughts.

(4) *Matter and Materialism.* Dr. Luce constantly asserts that the denial of matter in the Aristotelian sense would be the death blow of materialism, and he plainly attaches considerable importance to this implication of his doctrine. I take materialism to be the view that a person's mind and his mental processes are completely and one-sidedly dependent on his brain and nervous system and on physical processes in these. Now of course the empirical facts which seem *prima facie* to support this view are a datum common to all philosophers, which each school of philosophy must interpret in accordance with its own general principles. It seems to me that the mere rejection of matter in the Aristotelian sense would not carry one far in the direction of denying the alleged implication of these facts. The parts of Berkeley's system which would seem to be directly relevant to this end are the following. (i) The doctrine that the only possible efficient causes are minds exercising volition, and that causation in the sense of *de facto* regular sequence presupposes efficient causality at the back of nature as a whole. (ii) The doctrine that anything which is such that it could conceivably be sensed can actually exist when and only when someone is actually sensing it, and the inference that the greater part of nature (including the minute structure and the inner processes of the bodies of finite persons) exists only in so far as it is continually sensed by a non-human mind of superhuman wisdom and power. It is a long step from denying the existence of matter in the Aristotelian sense to establishing these characteristic positive doctrines and seeing exactly what would follow from them. It is perhaps inevitable that in this little book, written mainly for non-expert readers, Dr. Luce has not addressed himself as fully to this task as one could have wished.

C. D. BROAD.

The Contemplative Activity. By P. HAEZRAHI. (George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 139. Price 12s. 6d.)

These eight lectures are an interesting and ingenious attempt to rehabilitate the Kantian aesthetic. How far they achieve an adequate analysis of our most moving aesthetic experiences everybody must judge for himself.

The style, with several straggling sentences, anacolutha and long parentheses, may have been quite acceptable in good delivery but to a reader is often obstructive.

The thesis is that the pure aesthetic experience is quite devoid of sensuous charm, intellectual concepts—including recognition of resemblance—and of